Abstract
During highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) outbreaks, the United States Department of Agriculture Red Book requires infected egg production premises to discard on-site poultry products, including eggs that have been processed and stored prior to infection of the site. The disposal of these eggs adds to market disruptions, industry revenue loss, and federal indemnity paid. To support continuity of business movement decisions during HPAI outbreaks, the Secure Poultry Supply team at the University of Minnesota has been examining the risk of moving processed, segregated, and stored eggs from an infected premises that were laid by uninfected flocks to market. In 18 bi-weekly meetings, a workgroup consisting of federal and state regulators, egg layer representatives, and other subject matter experts identified three important criteria for achieving both acceptable risk and high confidence for movement: identification and removal of potentially contaminated eggs from the cooler; protection of cooler eggs from recontamination; and science-assessed egg truck disinfection protocols/practices for exiting an infected premises. This presentation addresses the science behind biosecurity and biocontainment practices and risk determination of moving uncontaminated eggs off an infected premises. Specifically, the efficacy of disinfection practices that are available for table eggs, large egg transport vehicles, and personal protective equipment under both early and late disease detection and with varied farm layouts and procedures for determining risk will be discussed.
Co-Author(s)
Rosemary Marusak, Mickey Leonard, Peter Bonney, Amos Ssematimba, Kaitlyn St. Charles, Sylvia Wanzala, Marie Culhane, and Carol Cardona
College of Veterinary Medicine, University of Minnesota, 1971 Commonwealth Ave,
St. Paul, MN 55108
Abstract Category
Biosecurity, mitigation, control, and post-epidemic considerations in poultry